Formerly seen as a beacon of center-left rule, Swedish politics are now following the emerging trend of the rise of fascism in Europe. In the recent elections, the Sweden Democrats (SD), a far-right party with neo-Nazi ties, became the second-largest party in the parliament, earning 20.6% of the votes. The previously outcasted far-right party is now running as the largest competitor to the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP). The SAP is the country’s oldest party and strongly opposes racial discrimination. The rise of the SD in the recent elections marked the nation’s shift into conservative, right-wing politics. What is striking about this shift is that the support the SD has received from the younger voting-age population in Sweden has almost doubled in the last four years. In 2018, 12% of voters between the ages of 18 and 21 voted for the SD (Walsh). In 2022, this percentage went up to 22%. This immense increase can be attributed to the rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Sweden, which the SD has masterfully employed by embracing xenophobic and ethno-nationalistic rhetoric and pushing such ideals onto the younger population through various social media platforms.
The 2015 European migrant crisis left its mark on Swedish politics, heightening anti-immigration sentiments within society. The number of asylum seekers in Europe reached 1.3 million that year, far surpassing prior years, and Sweden received the second-highest number of asylum applications per capita. Since the 1970s, which was when Sweden began accepting increasing numbers of immigrants, Swedish discourse on immigration was dominated by what was known as “the politically correct elite,” which was a socioeconomic group of socialists and liberals). This group was accused of causing the supposed loss of Swedish sovereignty by promoting multicultural values. The predominance of this group meant that since the 1970s, immigration was rarely politicized in Sweden. By linking the refugee crisis of the mid-2010s to the high crime rates, the SD developed xenophobic, Islamophobic, and ultimately ethno-nationalistic rhetoric, which changed the game. From 2019 to 2020, there has been an 11.01% increase in crime rates in Sweden, and a gradual and significant increase can be seen since 2015. The SD exploited this by placing its blame on migration from non-European countries.
The SD directly molded this link between the rise in crime rates and the increase in immigration. In stating that immigration from non-European nations leads to “high crime numbers, divorces and broken homes, abortions and low Swedish nativity,” they evoked the idea that non-European individuals contradicted an idealized version of Swedish morality and Swedish ethnicity. The idea of “Swedish nativity” is a remnant of the early years of the SD, when they would depict immigration as the “Islamification” of Sweden, and hence the loss of the “inherited essence” of being Swedish, which is ultimately an ethno-nationalistic ideal that glorifies the social and political domination of a Western European ethnic identity. By targeting a specific group (non-European Muslim immigrants in this case), the SD created a common enemy of the people, placing themselves in the position of the savior. They labeled themselves as the “defenders of the people’s home,” which references “folkhemmet,” a term used by Social Democrats in the 1930s to unite the working class. The SD, in contrast, uses the phrase to refer to the unity of Swedish nativity, claiming that they are defending it from the criminality and immorality induced by non-European immigration. What is striking about this rise in fascism in Sweden is that it appears not to be economy-driven. The SD, in its economic policies, is largely centrist. What marks it as a far-right party is its social ideals—primarily its nationalistic views. As a result of the high rates of crime being linked to the high rates of immigration, Swedish discourse on immigration stopped being dominated by “the politically correct elite.” Hence, the SD could now push its ideals onto the Swedish people, and predominantly onto young voters.
Throughout its campaign, the SD spent around $132,000 on social media advertising, which was the highest amount of money spent among all the parties. The runner-up, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, spent around $91,600. One study by Oxford University found that online misinformation, also known as “fake news,” played a crucial role in the 2018 Swedish election. They found that there was widespread circulation of such news on platforms like Twitter and Facebook and stated that “for every two professional content articles shared, one junk news article was shared.” They also found that the content of these articles perpetuated a right-wing narrative of immigration and Islam. Joakim Wallerstein, the head of communications of the SD, responded to the study by saying, “I think it is strange that a foreign institute is trying to label various news outlets in Sweden as “junk news” and release such a report in connection to an election.” He attempted to discredit Oxford University simply by drawing attention to its “foreignness”.
Moreover, what perhaps dominated the SD’s ideals circulating on social media was its popularity on TikTok, a platform designed to create echo chambers. Echo chambers are environments in which individuals solely encounter views that reiterate or reinforce their own, rather than being exposed to new ideas. TikTok’s algorithm works to create these environments as it functions in a manner that results in individuals almost exclusively being exposed to content that is like the ones they have interacted with previously. Before the elections, TikTok accounts that have a significant following have been posting content that argues the SD will be the one to solve the pressing issues in Sweden, particularly crime. The content is often centralized around Jimmie Åkesson, the leader of the SD, creating a cult of personality around him and designating him as this idealized “savior.” What makes TikTok a particularly unique social media platform when it comes to political campaigning is that it is primarily used by young people and as mentioned before, it is designed to create echo chambers. It develops this notion that anti-immigrant sentiment and an admiration for Jimmie Åkesson is the widespread view among young people. The money that the SD put into social media advertising and the circulation of their ideals and the support for them on different platforms show how they used social media effectively to promote their ideology and gear it towards young people. Having grown up in a society that is no longer dominated by the “politically correct elite” nor where immigration is discussed as apolitical, young people are more likely to be open to such negative discourse around immigrants, and social media platforms are the ideal mode to circulate and popularize this discourse among them.
Hence, a country that has long been known for its liberal, left-wing politics is now shifting towards conservative rule. Even in the age of Greta Thunberg, young people appear to play a significant role in this shift. Moreover, under the umbrella of anti-immigration, the SD’s rhetoric glorifies the idea of not only Swedish nationalism but also the idea of an inherited sort of Swedish ethnonationalism, which marks a considerable step back in building a more inclusive, equal society.