On February 8th, in an attack in Afghanistan's Nangahar province, two members of the US Army Special Forces – also known as Green Berets – were killed and six more were wounded. An individual wearing an Afghan uniform opened fire on the soldiers as they were leaving a compound where they had been meeting local military counterparts. It is unclear at this point if the shooter was actually a member of the Afghan security forces, or an impersonator.
Despite ongoing negotiations for a peace deal between the US and the Taliban, the deadly attack highlights the particular risk that Army Special Forces continue to face. Of the 17 American soldiers killed in Afghanistan in 2019, 10 were either from or working with the Green Berets.
In what has become an incredibly protracted and unpopular war, US military strategy in the Middle East has increasingly been typified by a reliance on special operations forces– utilizing small numbers of elite personnel to achieve outsized military objectives while maintaining relatively low visibility. Consequently, soldiers from special operations units increasingly constitute larger proportions of American casualties in Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East.
The Green Berets, whose motto ‘De Oppresso Liber’ means ‘to free the oppressed’, fulfil a particular niche in the wider framework of military special operations – specifically that of foreign internal defence. This requires Green Berets to work in tandem with foreign counterparts: training, advising, and even fighting alongside them in order to build up local military capabilities. There are clear benefits to such a mission in Afghanistan; on a strategic level, continuing to develop the capabilities of local security forces would allow the United States to continue its wider withdrawal from the country without abandoning it to internal strife.
In practice, this doctrine has not seemed to work well. In the initial invasion of the country, working with Afghan allies proved helpful in driving out the Taliban. However, local allied militias who refused to fight at night – giving up territory gained during the day back to the Taliban – also engineered a ceasefire that may have allowed Osama Bin Laden to escape undetected from Tora Bora in 2001.
This unreliability has not improved over time. The Afghanistan Papers, a special report recently published by the Washington Post, depicted Afghan security forces as uncommitted, incompetent, and corrupt – to the point that a significant portion of the populace perceives government forces to be a bigger threat than the Taliban themselves. Afghan Special Operations units – who work closely with Green Berets and are better trained and equipped than their regular army counterparts – likewise have proven to be problematic and inconsistent allies at best.
The recent attack also highlights the danger of insider attacks, and Taliban infiltration into the Afghan security establishment. In October 2018, a lack of background checks allowed a Taliban assassin to procure a job as a guard, ultimately resulting in the murder of a top Afghan general. The assailant narrowly missed the Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. More than 150 American soldiers and contractors have also been killed by Afghan uniformed personnel since 2008– some by soldiers from Afghan Special Operations units. Continuing to rely on untrustworthy allies will only increase the risk of further casualties amongst American troops.
The problematic nature of Army Special Forces doctrine in Afghanistan is compounded by the fact that often Green Berets, and conventional troops attached to them, are not given adequate support to fulfill their missions. A deadly ambush of a joint Green Beret - Nigerian military patrol in 2017 revealed a poorly planned mission with improper preparation and command oversight.Documents obtained by the New York Times also suggest that conventional military troops attached to Special Forces units do not receive the same level of training as their Green Beret counterparts– despite having to accompany them on the same missions, facing the same risks. One of the four Americans killed in the Niger patrol was an Army mechanic, who had not received specific training for Special Forces missions. Lacking support and preparation; fighting under a doctrine that has yet to have proven itself effective, Green Berets in Afghanistan face a losing and dangerous war.
Despite a recently negotiated agreement, which may pave the way for a peace agreement with the Taliban, the situation in Afghanistan remains tenuous – similar efforts fell apart last year after an attack that killed an American soldier. Regardless of whether an agreement leading to a partial or full US withdrawal does eventually come to fruition, one thing is for certain – a continued reliance on Army Special Forces in Afghanistan will only result in more American deaths. In their next move within America’s longest war, US lawmakers must seriously consider how many more American lives they are willing to risk in the vague and indeterminate hope of freeing the oppressed.